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Problem statement 
Within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), five of the fifteen members are 
permanent members who have the right to veto any of the proposed draft resolutions. The 
United States is one of the permanent members and has used their veto right multiple times 
since the end of the Cold War. On most of these occasions, the US used their right to veto on 
resolutions that concerned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, almost always choosing the side of 
Israel. Resolutions on this subject can be divided into three main categories; resolutions on 
violence, resolutions on maintaining the international law order and resolutions on 
settlements. 
 
Table 1 shows remarkable voting behavior. Since the Cold War, the US has always used their 
veto when resolutions were drafted against Israel concerning the settlements. However, in 
2016, the Obama administration did not use their right to veto on such a resolution, but 
instead chose to abstain from voting, which resulted in the adoption of Resolution 2334. This 
is remarkable voting behavior because the US has been consistent in their voting behavior 
regarding settlements until that moment. 
 
How can we explain such voting behavior? That is the problem that this paper will research. 
Voting behavior in the UNSC is an expression of foreign policy decision making by national 
states. Analyzing voting behavior can be done through different lenses, such as the cognitive 
school or role theory. These schools or theories have different assumptions and explanations 
for voting behavior, making it difficult to decide which one can best explain a change in 
voting behavior. This research will assess this by combining elements of both, using the 
theory of cognitive consistency from the cognitive school and national role conceptions from 
role theory. The perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers, being part of 
cognitive consistency, shape national role conceptions, which influences voting behavior in 
the UNSC. The goal of this research is to find out whether this combination will lead to a 
better explanation of voting behavior of veto powers in the United Nations Security Council. 
Therefore, the research question is: how do national role conceptions influence voting 
behavior of states with veto power in the United Nations Security Council? National role 
conceptions will be applied to the case of the voting behavior of the United States in the 
United Nations Security Council regarding the Israeli settlements to answer the research 
question.  
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Table 1: United Nations Security Council Resolutions on settlements regarding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict since the end of the Cold War, against Israel 
Resolution Year Vote Subject 
S/1997/199 1997 Veto Called on Israel to refrain from 
settlement activity and other 
actions in the occupied 
territories 
S/1997/241 1997 Veto Demanded Israel cease 
construction of settlement in 
East Jerusalem and all other 
settlement activity in the 
occupied territories 
S/2011/24 2011 Veto Condemned all Israeli 
settlements established in 
occupied Palestinian territory 
since 1967 as illegal 
Resolution 2334 2016 Abstention Reaffirmed that the 
establishment by Israel of 
settlement in the Palestinian 
territories occupied since 1967, 
including East Jerusalem, has 
no legal validity and is a major 
obstacle to the two-state 
solution and peace, demanded 
that Israel ceased all settlement 
activities 
Data taken from: http://www.washingtonreport.me/2005-may-june/an-updated-list-of-vetoes-cast-by-the-united-states-to-shield-israel-from-
criticism-by-the-u.n.-security-council.html and http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick 
 
Literature review 
Role perceptions on decision making 
In the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA), the process of foreign policy decision making is 
studied. Factors that influence decision making are the focus points and instead of viewing 
states as a ‘black box’, the policymakers behind the decision are analyzed. In order to find out 
what influences the behavior of states in international organizations from a FPA-perspective, 
it is necessary to look at the actors involved in the foreign policy decision making. 
There are two leading schools in FPA, namely the rational actor school and the cognitive 
school (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 7). The rational actor model is based on rationality and 
gaining maximum profit and minimum losses (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1995). Cognitive 
models are claiming that the assumptions of the rational actor model does not hold up in 
practice (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 8). The leading work in the area of the cognitive school 
is from Robert Jervis, who wrote the book Perception and Misperception in International 
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Politics (1976). A few assumptions of Jervis are that decision makers are not able to perceive 
the world in an accurate manner and that misperception can be understood and identified 
(Mintz & De Rouen, 2010, p. 38). Cognitive consistency is the leading theory on the influence 
of perception on decision making. It is largely understood as ‘the strong tendency for people 
to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images’ 
(Jervis, 1976, p.117). In addition, cognitive consistency ‘causes people to fit incoming 
information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there’ (Jervis, 
1976, p. 143). In this light, we can view cognitive consistency as a sort of self-fulfilling 
prophecy, meaning that the information that people receive is processed in a way that the 
information fits in with what they expect, their pre-existing images, and their pre-existing 
beliefs. Next to the effect that cognitive consistency has regarding decision making, Jervis 
sees another way that perceptions can influence decision making. Immediate concerns, or 
evoked sets, are of influence on perception and, thus, on decision making. Events that are ‘at 
the front of his mind’ leads to the fact that a person will perceive information in the light of 
such events. As a result, if we happen to know what events are occupying the person involved 
in decision making and the information that he has received, we are able to anticipate how this 
person interprets this information. Furthermore, once the person is occupied with current 
events and the received information, it is hard to ‘re-orient’ the attention  (Jervis, 1976, p. 
203, 215). 
  
As showed by Jervis, within FPA the foreign policy maker is central to understand foreign 
policy decision making, together with his images, beliefs and perception. Another theory that 
helps us understand the behavior considering foreign policy decision making is role theory, 
first introduced by Holsti (1970). Holsti identifies four concepts in order to understand foreign 
policy; role performance, national role conceptions, role prescriptions and position. The 
attitudes, decision, and actions of governments make up the role performance. National role 
conceptions are ‘self-defined’ and role prescriptions are under influence of the ‘external 
environment’ (Holsti, 1970, p. 240). These concepts take place in a certain position, which is 
‘a system of role prescriptions’ (Holsti, 1970, p. 240). In order to adopt this theory, 
originating from other social sciences, he clarifies these concepts to utilize them in FPA. 
Figure 1 is a visual representation of these concepts. According to the findings of Holsti, 
states adopt multiple roles in their foreign policy, in his sample, on average, countries have 
4.6 role conceptions (Holsti, 1970, p. 277). Therefore, we cannot see every national role 
conception in the same light, since they do not mutually exclude one another and different 
5 
 
roles are used for different purposes. Examples of the most used national roles in Holsti’s 
research are ‘regional-subsystem collaborator’, ‘independent’, and ‘liberator-supporter’ 
(1970, p. 290). 
 
Such a national role conception is made up of the policymakers’ definitions of the decisions 
and actions of the state (Holsti, 1970, p. 245-246). Others have written about national role 
conceptions as well. One definition from Wish (1980, p. 533) is ‘national role conceptions are 
defined as foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their nation’s positions in the international 
system.[..] National role conceptions provide norms, guidelines, and standards which affect 
many aspects of decision making’. Another way the national role conception is seen is as an 
umbrella term for: ‘what ‘we want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to 
be, and should be,’ where the “we” represents nation and state as a social collectivity.’ (Krotz, 
2002, p. 4). 
 
Figure 1: Role Theory and Foreign Policy: National Role Conceptions and Prescriptions as 
Independent Variables (Holsti, 1970, p. 245) 
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Although critics of role theory agree that individuals play a role in foreign policy behavior, 
they do not agree that foreign policy behavior can be explained on the basis of individual 
decisions and actions. Wendt, for example, stated that ‘state action is no more reducible to 
those individuals than their action is reducible to neurons in the brain.’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 221). 
Even though Wendt does look further than the structural system with his notion that ideas and 
identity shape state behavior, he does not take the human factor into account. Wendt does not 
acknowledge that only human beings are capable of having ideas, can create or change 
identities, or act on the basis of identity (Hudson, 2013, p. 12). Ideas or identities do not just 
appear, they have to develop from the minds of human beings. Including human beings in 
theories of international relations is deemed necessary by Hudson, because, especially after 
the end of the Cold War, it contributes to the strength of such theories. Since behavior of 
different states is a dynamic process with changing actors and structures, the addition of the 
analysis of human beings will contribute to academic research in the field of international 
relations and foreign policy analysis (Hudson, 2013, p. 15). In this research, different levels of 
analysis will be combined, namely the level of the individual decision-maker in the light of 
cognitive consistency and the level of national role in the light of role theory and national role 
conceptions. Theoretical integration helps ‘to develop a more complete perspective on foreign 
policy decision-making.’ (Hudson, 2013, p. 185). Hudson shows that Wendt’s critique is not 
strong enough to survive, since his theory is based on ideas and identities, but not on human 
beings, while human beings eventually shape ideas and identities. This research will include 
the role of human beings to explain voting behavior since I believe that it is essential to 
acknowledge the influence that human beings have on ideas and identities. Ideas and 
identities do not just exist or appear from nowhere, they are created by human beings. 
Furthermore, role conceptions reveal the motives and the intentions behind foreign policy 
behavior, hence it is a mixture of perceptions of reality (Aggestam, 2006, pp. 19-20). In sum, 
individual perceptions are key to understand national role conceptions.  
 
My contribution to the state of research will be the exploration of a new combination within 
foreign policy analysis. Combining cognitive consistency with national role conceptions is a 
new way to analyze voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council. Foreign policy 
behavior, such as voting behavior, can be analyzed through different ways, but usually the 
focus is one theory in a particular school, such as the cognitive school. This research will 
combine elements from different schools or theories, in order to see whether such a 
combination will lead to a better perspective and explanation of voting behavior in the United 
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Nations Security Council. If it does gives us a better perspective, than the influence of human 
beings in foreign policy apparently is important, contrary to what Wendt believes. That is 
what this research will try to discover.  
 
Additionally, this research will test if national role conceptions are useful in order to 
understand voting behavior in the UNSC. The empirical analysis will show if national role 
conceptions can be a contribution to the understanding of voting behavior. National role 
conceptions and role theory are focused on foreign policy behavior and, therefore, should be 
able to explain an expression of foreign policy behavior such as voting behavior. This 
research will test this. Furthermore, the foundations from both approaches lie in the 1970s, 
which is almost 50 years ago. It will be a good test for these relatively old theories if they can 
stand the test of time nowadays.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Subsequently, the concepts of cognitive consistency and national role conceptions will be 
defined in this theoretical framework. In the literature review I have found that cognitive 
consistency is related to images, beliefs and perceptions, as mentioned by Jervis. But how are 
these terms related? Going into further detail on cognitive consistency, Jervis shows that ‘we 
tend to believe that countries we like do things we like, support goals we favor, and oppose 
countries that we oppose. We tend to think that countries that are our enemies make proposals 
that would harm us, work against the interests of our friends, and aid our opponents.’ (1976, 
pp. 117-118). Apparently, cognitive consistency is a mechanism that processes information in 
such a way that it will lead to consistent behavior of people, which is in agreement with their 
beliefs and perception. Jervis uses the terms images and beliefs in a similar way and I agree 
with him, since these terms can be used in a similar fashion. Based on Chapter Four of 
Jervis’s book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, which shows his views 
on cognitive consistency and the related terms of perception, images and beliefs, this research 
defines cognitive consistency as ‘perception, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers.’ 
 
National role conceptions are not so different from images and beliefs. They are self-defined, 
and, thus, very personal specific, just like images and beliefs. How policymakers view the 
decisions and actions of the state influences the national role conception (Holsti, 1970). There 
is a parallel to the concepts of images and beliefs, and the view of policymakers. In addition, 
Wish’s definition of national role conceptions, ‘foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their 
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nation’s positions in the international system’, focuses on the perception of policymakers 
(1980, p. 533). However, Krotz’s definition of national role conception, ‘‘what ‘we want and 
what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be,’ where the “we” 
represents nation and state as a social collectivity’, points at social collectivity rather than 
policymakers (2002, p. 4). Although there is a point of discussion whether national role 
conceptions are created by policymakers or the social collectivity, this paper will not research 
this difference. The focus lies on policymakers because I want to include the concept of 
cognitive consistency and if I assume that national role conceptions come from the social 
collective of a state then it is hardly possible to see the effect cognitive consistency has on 
national role conceptions or voting behavior. The key issue with such an assumption is that I 
would have to find out which social group has the most influence on the creation of a national 
role conceptions, which is not the goal of this particular research. Therefore, the assumption 
of this paper is that national role conceptions are created through foreign policy makers, to be 
more precise, the perceptions, images, and beliefs of foreign policy makers because I use the 
concept of cognitive consistency in relation to national role conceptions. Perceptions take 
shape through images and beliefs, so it becomes possible to connect the theories of Jervis and 
Holsti. The relationship between these different concepts and how it will be used in this 
research is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between the concepts of perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign 
policy makers, national role conceptions, and voting behavior in the UNSC
 
Perceptions, 
images, and 
beliefs of 
foreign 
policy 
makers 
National 
Role 
Conceptions 
Voting 
behavior in 
the UNSC 
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With the knowledge that national role conceptions take shape from perceptions, images, and 
beliefs of foreign policy makers, the next step is to define national role conceptions itself. The 
definition of national role conceptions that is used in this research is as follows: National role 
conceptions are the perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers about how their 
nations should act in the international system. This definition is taken from Holsti (1970) and 
Wish (1980).  More clarification is needed on the terms ‘images’ and ‘beliefs’ to conduct our 
research. Images are in a foreign policy decision making setting are formed by ‘the perceived 
relative capability of the other actor, the perceived threat and/or opportunity another actor 
represents, and the perceived culture of the other actor’ (Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, & 
Ciarrochi, 1997, p. 407-408). Cognitive consistency acts as a filter for information to fit into 
pre-existing beliefs, as is shown by Jervis (1976). In that sense, beliefs tend to be ‘frames for 
understanding the world’ (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 512).  
 
As established, national role conceptions (NRCs) include the perceptions, images, and beliefs 
of foreign policy decision makers. Their ‘image’ of suitable actions and decisions of their 
state in relation to the external environment is of influence on the behavior of states. 
Differences in NRCs are explained by various indicators, as is shown in Table 2. Based on 
Wish’s classification of national role conceptions, this research uses her ten variables that can 
be indicators of different national role conceptions (1980, p. 535-540). The first two are based 
on the perception of status, power and influence. 
(1) ‘Level of influence’. Every role conception’s level of influence is on the national, 
bilateral, regional or global level (Wish, 1980, p. 537). 
(2) ‘Perception of dominance’. Every role conception’s perception of dominance is as 
equal, example for others to follow, or as leader (Wish, 1980, p. 538). 
The following variables are focused on the motivational orientation of national role 
conceptions. 
(3) ‘Individualistic motivations’. A national role conception is either based on 
individualistic motivations or non-individualistic motivations. Individualistic 
motivations are focused on the domestic level, while non-individualistic motivations 
stretch further to the international level (Wish, 1980, p. 538). 
(4) ‘Competitive motivations’. National role conceptions are either cooperatively-
oriented, competitively-oriented or mixed (both cooperative and competitive, for 
example when cooperation with other states in order to compete with another state or a 
group of other states) in relation to other states (Wish, 1980, p. 538). 
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(5) ‘Amount of change proposed’. Every role conception’s amount of change proposed 
is either to maintain the status quo, to propose some change, or to change the complete 
system. (Wish, 1980, p. 539). 
The last five variables consists of different problem areas that national role conceptions take 
into account. 
(6) ‘Territorial/defense’. Occurs in a national role conception when it is about 
defending their own or other’s territory, or about the security of its own or other states 
(Wish, 1980, p. 540). 
(7) ‘Ideological’. When a national role conception defends or promotes a value system 
or way of life (Wish, 1980, p. 540). 
(8) ‘Political/diplomatic’. If a national role conception influences the positions or 
relationships between states (Wish, 1980, p. 540). 
(9) ‘Universal values’. National role conceptions that promote peace, justice, or human 
rights (Wish, 1980, p. 540). 
(10) ‘Economic’. Applicable when a national role conception is focused on 
maintaining or expanding their or other’s economic capabilities, resources or 
development (Wish, 1980, p. 540) . 
Considering these last five variables, they are only adopted in Table 2 when the particular 
issue area is relevant for the national role conception, they are not mentioned when they are 
not relevant for a national role conception. 
 
For this research, the ‘personality or political needs’ of foreign policy decision makers are the 
most relevant. Besides these sources, the role prescriptions are important as well, such as the 
structure of the international system, or norms of international organizations (Holsti, 1970, p. 
245-246; Shih, 2012, p. 72). Furthermore, NRCs are reflections of the views from key foreign 
policy decision makers. By key foreign policy decision makers I mean the people that have 
the authority to make autonomous decisions on behalf of their government, for example, the 
president, prime minister, defense minister and foreign policy minister of a country (Chafetz, 
Abramson & Grillot, 1996, p. 740; Macleod 1997, p. 163). Many researchers have used 
statements from these policy makers to find out what NRCs of a state are (Holsti 1970; 
Chafetz et al. 1996; Le Prestre 1997; Harnisch 2012; Cantir & Kaarbo 2012). Analyzing 
statements of key foreign policy decision makers are an indicator of NRCs, because of the 
simple fact that these people make the decisions. The relationship between foreign policy 
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behavior and the NRCs of policy makers is confirmed by Adigbuo, for example, in his work 
Beyond IR Theories: The Case for National Role Conceptions (2007). 
 
Table 2: National Role Conceptions 
National role conception Indicators Author 
Regional protector ‘Places emphasis on the function of 
providing protection for adjacent regions.’ 
Level of influence: regional level 
Perception of dominance: leader 
Individualistic motivations: non-
individualistic motivations 
Competitive motivations: mixed 
motivations. 
Amount of change proposed: 
Change the status quo. 
Territorial/defense 
Holsti (1970, pp. 261-262, 276, 296); 
Chafetz et al. (1996, p. 734); Le Prestre 
(1997, p. 69) 
Defender of the faith The role to defend value systems from 
attack, carrying the responsibility to 
maintain an ideology for other states. 
Level of influence: global 
Perception of dominance: leader 
Individualistic motivations: non-
individualistic motivations 
Competitive motivations: mixed 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: 
Status quo 
Territorial/defense 
Ideological 
Holsti (1970, pp. 264, 276, 296) 
Integrator A role that settles, or wants to settle, 
conflicts between states. This is shown by 
an indication of perceptions that it has been 
a continuous task to help in settlement 
between states. Also the strengthening of 
multilateral institutions and regimes, and 
promoting cooperation in solving 
transnational issues. 
Level of influence: Global 
Perception of dominance:  Equal 
Individualistic motivations:  
Non-individualistic motivations 
Competitive motivations: Cooperative 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: 
Change the status quo 
Political/diplomatic 
Holsti (1970, pp. 265, 276, 296); Le Prestre 
(1997, p. 69) 
Developer The role of developer feels a ‘special duty 
or obligation to assist underdeveloped 
countries’. Providing ‘economic aid to 
developing countries.’ 
Level of influence: global 
Perception of dominance: example 
Individualistic motivations: non-
individualistic motivations 
Competitive motivations:  
Cooperative motivations 
Amount of change proposed: 
Change the status quo 
Economic 
Holsti (1970, pp. 266, 276, 296); Le Prestre 
(1997, p. 69) 
Global system leader ‘Leads other states in creating and 
maintaining the emerging global order.’ 
Level of influence: Global 
Perception of dominance: Leader 
Individualistic motivations: Individualistic 
motivations 
Competitive motivations: Competitive 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: Change of 
status quo 
Political/diplomatic 
Chafetz et al. (1996, p. 734) 
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Table 2 continued. 
Hegemon ‘Guarantor of the peace and of existing 
security regimes.’ 
Level of influence: Global 
Perception of dominance: Leader 
Individualistic motivations: non-
individualistic motivations 
Competitive motivations: Mixed 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: Status quo 
Territorial/defense 
Universal values 
 
Le Prestre (1997, p. 69) 
Tribune Promote democracy and freedom, promote 
human rights, universal values and ideas 
Level of influence: global 
Perception of dominance: example 
Individualistic motivations: individualistic 
motivations 
Competitive motivations: mixed 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: change the 
status quo 
Ideological 
Universal values 
 
Le Prestre (1997, p. 69) 
Guardian Consolidate national power rather than 
shape the international environment 
Level of influence: national 
Perception of dominance: equal 
Individualistic motivations: individualistic 
motivations 
Competitive motivations: competitive 
motivations 
Amount of change proposed: status quo 
Territorial/defense 
 
Le Prestre (1997, p. 69) 
 
Holsti (1970) found seventeen NRCs in his study and others have followed. Since the NRCs 
of Holsti are from a Cold War perspective, this study takes into account work from other 
researches post-Cold War, such as Chafetz et al. (1996) and Le Prestre (1997), and dismisses 
the NRCs that are only of value in the Cold War setting. Based on their work, it is possible to 
identify NRCs that the United States have had in the past. All the possible applicable NRCs to 
the United States are shown in Table 2. 
 
From the national role conceptions and their indicators shown in Table 2, several hypotheses 
can be tested: 
 
H1: The more a veto power sees its level of influence as national, the more likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H2: The more a veto power sees its level of influence as global, the less likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H3: The more a veto power’s perception of dominance is as equal, the less likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
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H4: The more a veto power’s perception of dominance is as leader, the more likely the 
veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H5: The more a veto power’s motivations are individualistic, the more likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H6: The more a veto power’s motivations are non-individualistic, the less likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H7: The more a veto power’s motivations are cooperative, the less likely the veto power is 
to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H8: The more a veto power’s motivations are competitive, the more likely the veto power 
is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H9: The more a veto power wants to maintain the status quo, the more likely the veto 
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H10: The more a veto power wants to change the system, the less likely the veto power is to 
use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
H11: The more a veto power wants to defend their or other’s territory, or focuses on the 
security of its own or others, the less likely the veto power is to use their right to veto 
in the United Nations Security Council. 
H12: The more a veto power wants to defend or promote a value system or way of life, the 
 more likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security 
Council. 
H13: The more a veto power wants to influence the position or relationships between states, 
the less likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security 
Council. 
H14: The more a veto power wants to promote peace, justice, or human rights, the less 
likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security 
Council. 
H15:  The more a veto power wants to maintain or expand their or other’s economic 
capabilities, resources or development, the less likely the veto power is to use their 
right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
These hypotheses will help to research the effect of ‘perceptions images, and beliefs of 
foreign policy makers’, and ‘national role conceptions’ on voting behavior, in this case the 
voting behavior of the United States in the United Nations Security Council regarding the 
Israeli settlements. 
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Research design 
Methodology 
This research design will be designed so that it is possible to find out what the influence of 
national role conceptions is on voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council. 
Therefore, we will be testing hypotheses by using a comparative case study. Taking the 
example of previous research that is conducted in the area of national role conceptions (Le 
Prestre, 1997, Macleod, 1997, Shih 2012), I believe that this research design is best suitable 
for answering our research question: how do national role conceptions influence voting 
behavior of states with veto power in the United Nations Security Council? 
 
I believe that comparative case study research is the best research method in order to answer 
the research question for several reasons. Firstly, to find out relevant national role conceptions 
for states, it is necessary to analyze cases for national role conceptions and compare these 
cases to establish an effect on voting behavior in the UNSC. Secondly, to analyze the 
influence of national role conceptions on voting behavior of states with veto power in the 
UNSC, there must be looked at such states who have veto power and their national role 
conceptions. Comparing national role conceptions at different times within the same state, but 
with different voting behavior in the UNSC, will show a certain relationship between these 
national role conceptions and the voting  behavior. The change in national role conceptions 
might explain the change in voting behavior, therefore I have chosen to use a comparative 
case study design. 
 
By choosing to analyze one state, the United States, at two different times connected to two 
different voting moments in the UNSC, but both within the Obama administration, the only 
change that occurs in this model is that of a possible difference in national role conceptions 
and different voting behavior in the UNSC. Treating the state and the administration as a 
constant factor, it becomes easier to identify a relationship between national role conceptions 
and voting behavior in the UNSC, because there is no need to worry about differences 
between states or administrations. The question of the Israeli settlements has always been a 
sensitive matter for the United States, since they have always exercised their right to veto on 
this subject, until 23 December 2016, when for the first time, the US abstained from voting. 
The uniqueness of this case and the engagement of the US on this case makes it interesting to 
research. I have chosen to use the United States for my case study because it is one of the veto 
powers in the United Nations Security Council and has showed very consistent voting 
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behavior in the UNSC on resolutions regarding Israeli settlements. This consistent voting 
behavior has been so predictable that a change in this voting behavior is remarkable. I have 
chosen to just analyze the United States as the veto power, and no other veto powers, because 
I did not find voting behavior as consistent as the US’s on Israeli settlements. Furthermore, 
the latest case I am analyzing occurred on 23 December 2016, which is recent and therefore 
interesting to research in my attempt to explain this change in voting behavior in the light of 
national role conceptions. 
 
Data selection 
Researching statements made by President Obama and the Permanent Representative of the 
US at the UN will help us understanding the national role conceptions that play a part in 
voting behavior of the US in the UNSC regarding the Israeli settlements. Content analysis of 
these statements is most appropriate because this approach is often used in the field of role 
theory to unveil the concept of national role conceptions (Holsti 1970; Chafetz et al. 1996; Le 
Prestre 1997).  
 
According to Bryman, content analysis is about two qualities: ‘objectivity and being 
systematic’ (2012, p. 289). To ensure that this research will be objective and systematic, I 
create a coding schedule and a coding manual, based on the examples of Bryman (2012, p. 
299-300). The coding schedule is used to enter all the data that is observed in the selected 
statements. The instruction on how to enter the data in the coding schedule can be found in 
the coding manual. Figure 3 shows the coding schedule and figure 4 shows the coding 
manual. 
Figure 3: Coding schedule 
Statement  
Day  
Month  
Year  
Level of influence  
Perception of dominance  
Motivations I  
Motivations II  
Amount of change proposed  
Territorial/defense  
Ideological  
Political/diplomatic  
Universal values  
Economic  
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Figure 4: Coding manual based on Wish’s classification of national role conceptions (1980, 
pp. 537-540) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 continued. 
Level of influence       
1. National - only its own internal affairs 
2. Bilateral - one other state 
3. Regional - a region 
4. Global - the world, the international system 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Perception of dominance 
1. Equal – equal partnership or cooperative venture 
2. Example for others to follow 
3. Leader – leads, defends or protects other states 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Motivations I 
1. Individualistic – for the United States 
2. Non-individualistic – for the ‘greater good’, the world 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Motivations II 
1. Cooperative – cooperate with other states 
2. Mixed – cooperate with some states in order to compete with other states 
3. Competitive – compete with other states 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Amount of change proposed 
1. ‘Maintain the status quo’ – no change 
2. Some change 
3. ‘A complete system overhaul’ 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Territorial/defense 
1. ‘The nation maintains or defends its own or its collaborator’s territorial integrity or security.’ 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Ideological 
1. ‘The nation defends,  promotes or inhibits a value system or way of life.’ – communism, capitalism, socialism, 
democracy 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Political/diplomatic 
1. ‘The nations affects the positions or relationships between states.’ 
If not applicable, code – 
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Universal values 
1. The nation promotes a situation of peace, justice or human rights. 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Economic 
1. The nation focuses on maintaining or expanding their or other’s economic capabilities, resources or development. 
If not applicable, code – 
 
Although this research is not facing the problem of inter-coder reliability, because there is 
consistency between the coders since I am the only coder in this research, intra-coder 
reliability has to be avoided. Intra-coder reliability means that ‘each coder must be consistent 
over time’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 304). The creation of a coding schedule and a coding manual 
will lead to greater consistency in the content analysis on my part. Additionally, the coding 
occurred in a few days, which increases the chance of intra-coder reliability. Had the coding 
lasted for a longer period of time, the intra-coder reliability may have been more of an issue. 
 
In order to research the change in voting behavior of the US in the UNSC regarding Israeli 
settlements, I will compare the indicators of the relevant national role conceptions on the last 
two resolutions on this subject with each other, namely draft resolution 24 in 2011 and 
resolution 2334 in 2016 (see Table 1). On draft resolution 24 in 2011, the US used their right 
to veto, but on resolution 2334, the US abstained from voting. This is a disturbance of the 
voting pattern that the US had since the end of the Cold War and in order to investigate this 
change in voting behavior I need to look deeper into these two cases. National role 
conceptions will help in explaining this voting behavior. Eight statements from President 
Obama and the Permanent Representative of the US at the UN prior to draft resolution 24 (18 
February 2011) and eight statements from President Obama and the Permanent Representative 
of the US at the UN after draft resolution 24 until resolution 2334 (23 December 2016) will be 
analyzed to discover the relevant national role conceptions of the United States at the time 
that these resolutions came to a vote in the United Nations Security Council. The statements 
that are being used are general foreign policy statements, so that national role conceptions can 
be identified by using content analysis. Table 3 shows an overview of the statements that are 
being used. 
 
The dependent variable in this research is voting behavior. Voting behavior is linked to 
Holsti’s ‘national role performance’, which encompasses the ‘general foreign policy behavior 
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of governments’, consisting of attitudes, decisions, and actions toward other states (1970, p. 
245). In this research, this will be seen as the voting behavior of the United States in the 
United Nations Security Council regarding the Israeli settlements. Since this voting behavior 
is an expression of foreign policy behavior it is suitable for this research. 
 
The independent variables in this research are ‘perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign 
policy makers’ and ‘national role conceptions’. These variables are measured through 
statements of President Obama and the operating Permanent Representative of the US at the 
UN. Statements are an expression of the perceptions, images and beliefs foreign policy 
makers have, and as such, regarded as a useable source of information. National role 
conceptions can be extracted from such statements, because they are an expression of these 
perception, images and beliefs. 
 
Table 3: Statements used for the identification of national role conceptions 
Related to draft resolution 24 (18 February 2011) Related to Resolution 2334 (23 December 2016) 
Speech Obama in Prague, 5 April 2009 Speech Obama at the MacDill Airforce Base, 17 
September 2014 
Speech Obama to the Turkish Parliament, 6 April 
2009 
Speech Obama at the UN General Assembly, 24 
September 2014 
Speech Obama at Cairo University, 4 June 2009 Speech Obama at the UN General Assembly, 28 
September 2015 
Speech Obama to the Ghanaian Parliament, 11 July 
2009 
Speech Obama at the Paris Climate Conference, 30 
November 2015 
Speech Obama to the UN General Assembly, 23 
September 2009 
Speech Obama at Hannover, 25 April 2016 
Speech Obama at the acceptance of the Nobel Peace 
Prize, 10 December 2009 
Speech Obama at the UN General Assembly, 20 
September 2016 
Speech Obama at the UN General Assembly 2010 Speech Obama in Athens, 16 November 2016 
Statement by Rice at the UN Security Council about 
resolution 24 
Statement by Power at the UN Security Council about 
resolution 2334 
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Empirical analysis 
In approaching these statements, there will be looked for indicators of national role 
conceptions of the United States. Based on Table 2 and the hypotheses, there have been 
identified several possible national role conceptions from previous research. Indicators for the 
national role conceptions are level of influence, perception of dominance, individualistic 
motivations, competitive motivations, amount of change proposed, territorial/defense, 
ideological, political/diplomatic, universal values and economic. Based on these indicators, 
there will be looked in the selected statements for national role conceptions to find out 
whether which NRCs are relevant for the Obama administration during the time period of 
both resolutions. Afterwards, when the indicators of the Obama administration are clear, the 
hypotheses will be tested in order to see if they can explain the difference in voting behavior 
in the UNSC regarding Israeli settlements. 
I use content analysis to study these statements in order to look for indicators of national role 
conceptions. Le Prestre, for example, also used content analysis to identify national role 
conceptions, using key words such as ‘America’, ‘American’, ‘we’, our’, and ‘United States’ 
to find statements that are useful in the light of national role conceptions (1997, p. 68). After 
the selection of paragraphs using Le Prestre’s key words, I looked for key words that indicate 
a national role conception. The key words that I selected are: national, regional, global, equal, 
example, leader, lead, cooperate, cooperative, competitive, status quo, change, territorial, 
defense, security, threat, ideology, ideological, ideals, diplomatic, diplomacy, political, 
universal values, universal, economic, economy, protection, protect, region, defend, 
responsibility, conflict, settle, settlement, assist, support, develop, peace, democracy, 
democratic, freedom, human rights, and power. These two steps lead to the findings of 
multiple paragraphs in the speeches that I selected, with a total of 168 paragraphs that I could 
use in my analysis. The following tables show the results of my content analysis. 
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Table 4: Indicators national role conceptions for the United States related to draft resolution 
24 (18 February 2011) 
Variables Prague Ankara Cairo Accra UNGA Oslo UNGA Resolution 
Level of influence         
1 – National - 1 4 - 1 2 - - 
2 – Bilateral - 3 - - - 1 3 - 
3 – Regional 1 4 3 2 3 - 3 7 
4 – Global 4 - 3 6 7 9 11 - 
n/a - 1 - - 1 - 1 - 
Perception of 
dominance 
        
1 – Equal 1 3 - - 3 2 5 3 
2 – Example 1 2 4 3 2 2 6 - 
3 – Leader 3 3 3 5 6 5 5 4 
n/a - 1 3 - 1 3 2 - 
Motivations I         
1 – Individualistic 2 3 1 - 1 6 4 1 
2 – Non-
individualistic 
3 6 9 8 11 6 14 5 
n/a - - - - - - - 1 
Motivations II         
1 - Cooperative 4 4 5 6 8 4 7 3 
2 - Mixed - 2 1 2 2 6 6 3 
3 - Competitive - 1 1 - - 1 1 1 
n/a 1 2 3 - 2 1 4 - 
Amount of change 
proposed 
        
1 – Status quo - - - - - - - - 
2 – Some change 3 8 8 6 10 6 14 6 
3 – Complete 
system overhaul 
2 1 1 2 1 - 1 - 
n/a - - 1 - 1 6 - 1 
         
Territorial/defense 4 5 3 3 7 8 6 4 
n/a 1 4 7 5 5 4 12 3 
         
Ideological 1 4 2 2 1 4 4 1 
n/a 4 5 8 6 11 8 14 6 
         
Political/diplomatic - 4 2 1 4 - 3 5 
n/a 5 5 8 7 8 12 15 2 
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Table 4 continued. 
Universal values 1 5 6 3 7 8 9 5 
n/a 4 4 4 5 5 4 9 2 
         
Economic 1 2 2 2 4 1 7 - 
n.a 4 7 8 6 8 11 11 7 
 
Table 5: Indicators national role conceptions for the United States related to resolution 2334 
(23 December 2016) 
Variables MacDill UNGA  UNGA  Paris Hannover UNGA Athens Resolution 
Level of influence         
1 – National 1 - - - - 1 1 - 
2 – Bilateral - 1 2 1 - - 1 2 
3 – Regional 2 8 4 - 12 1 2 3 
4 – Global 3 8 14 6 2 5 7 - 
n/a - - - - - - - - 
Perception of 
dominance 
        
1 – Equal 1 2 1 3 7 - 3 - 
2 – Example - 2 8 2 2 1 4 1 
3 – Leader 5 13 11 1 5 5 4 3 
n/a - - - 1 - 1 - 1 
Motivations I         
1 – Individualistic 3 4 5 1 1 3 2 4 
2 – Non-
individualistic 
3 13 14 6 13 4 9 1 
n/a - - 1 - - - - - 
Motivations II         
1 - Cooperative 1 8 5 6 9 2 5 1 
2 - Mixed 3 7 10 - 4 4 5 2 
3 - Competitive - 1 1 - - - - 2 
n/a 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 - 
Amount of change 
proposed 
        
1 – Status quo 1 - 1 - - 1 1 1 
2 – Some change 3 15 14 6 10 5 7 2 
3 – Complete 
system overhaul 
- 1 1 1 - - - - 
n/a 2 1 4 - 4 1 3 2 
         
Territorial/defense 5 11 12 2 11 3 2 4 
n/a 1 6 8 5 3 4 9 1 
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Table 5 continued. 
Ideological 1 4 6 - 5 4 9 - 
n/a 5 13 14 7 9 3 2 5 
         
Political/diplomatic - 5 5 - 3 2 1 2 
n/a 6 12 15 7 11 5 10 3 
         
Universal values 1 6 7 1 3 2 3 3 
n/a 5 11 13 6 11 5 8 2 
         
Economic - 7 6 6 5 4 1 - 
n/a 6 10 14 1 9 3 10 5 
 
Table 6: Total times counted indicators and averages 
Variables Draft resolution 
24 18 Feb 2011 
total 
Averages Resolution 2334 
23 Dec 2016 total 
Averages 
Level of influence  3,22  3,37 
1 – National 8  3  
2 – Bilateral 7  7  
3 – Regional 23  32  
4 – Global 40  45  
n/a 3  0  
Perception of 
dominance 
 2,24  2,36 
1 – Equal 17  17  
2 – Example 20  20  
3 – Leader 34  47  
n/a 10  3  
Motivations I  1,78  1,73 
1 – Individualistic 18  23  
2 – Non-
individualistic 
62  63  
n/a 1  1  
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Table 6 continued. 
Motivations II  1,47  1,57 
1 – Cooperative 41  37  
2 – Mixed 22  35  
3 – Competitive 5  4  
n/a 13  11  
Amount of change 
proposed 
 2,12  1,97 
1 – Status quo 0  5  
2 – Some change 61  62  
3 – Complete 
system overhaul 
8  3  
n/a 12  17  
 
Table 7: Total times counted indicators and percentages 
Variables Draft resolution 24 
18 Feb 2011 
Percentages Resolution 2334 23 
Dec 2016 
Percentages 
Territorial/defense 40 49,38% 50 57,47% 
n/a 41  37  
     
Ideological 19 23,46% 29 33,33% 
n/a 62  58  
     
Political/diplomatic 19 23,46% 18 20,69% 
n/a 62  69  
     
Universal values 44 54,32% 26 29,89% 
n/a 37  61  
     
Economic 19 23,46% 29 33,33% 
n/a 62  58  
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These tables show the results of the data that has been analyzed. For each selected paragraph, 
the times were counted when a statement was made or mentioned regarding each of the 
variables and put in the corresponding categories in the coding schedule according to the 
coding manual. These results were put together in two categories; statements regarding the 
draft resolution 24 on 18 February 2011 and statements regarding resolution 2334 on 23 
December 2016. Out of these results, averages and percentages could be calculated. For the 
variables ‘level of influence’, ‘perception of dominance’, ‘motivations I’, ‘motivations II’, 
and ‘amount of change proposed’, this was done through averages that show a score on the 
scale of the respective  variables. For example, the score on ‘level on influence’ was 3,22 
regarding draft resolution 24, which means that the average level on influence is in between 
Regional (3) and Global (4). The variables ‘territorial/defense’, ‘ideological’, 
‘political/diplomatic’, ‘universal values’, and ‘economic’, the scores are measured in 
percentages because this shows in how much of the statements the particular issue area was 
being mentioned. But, most interesting of these results is the difference in scores between the 
statements regarding draft resolution 24 on 18 February 2011 and resolution 2334 on 23 
December 2016, because the hypotheses can be tested on basis of these differences. Below, 
the transition between the indicators of the national role conceptions between 18 February 
2011 and 23 December 2016 is shown. As a reminder, the words ‘veto’ and ‘abstaining’ are 
added because that is what the United States voted in the United Nations Security Council on 
resolutions regarding Israeli settlements. 
 
Table 8: Differences in indicators of national role conceptions 
Variable 18 Feb 2011 – ‘Veto’ 23 Dec 2016 – ‘Abstaining’ 
Level of influence 3,2179 3,3678 
Perception of dominance 2,2394 2,3571 
Motivations I 1,775 1,7326 
Motivations II 1,4706 1,5658 
Amount of change proposed 2,1159 1,9714 
Territorial/defense 49,38% 57,47% 
Ideological 23,46% 33,33% 
Political/diplomatic 23,46% 20,69% 
Universal values 54,32% 29,89% 
Economic 23,46% 33,33% 
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A few general remarks can be made on the basis of these numbers: 
1) The United States sees its level of influence as more global in 2016 than in 2011 
2) The United States’ perception of dominance is more as leader in 2016 than in 2011 
3) The United States’ motivations are more individualistic in 2016 than in 2011 
4) The United States’ motivations are more competitive in 2016 than in 2011 
5) The United States wants to maintain the status quo more in 2016 than in 2011 
6) The United States is more focused on defending their or other’s territory, or focused on the 
security of its own or others in 2016 than in 2011. 
7) The United States is more focused on defending or promoting a value system or way of life 
in 2016 than in 2011. 
8) The United States is less focused on influencing the position or relationships between states 
in 2016 than in 2011. 
9) The United States is less focused on promoting peace or human rights in 2016 than in 
2011. 
10) The United States is more focused on maintaining or expanding their or other’s economic 
capabilities, resources or development in 2016 than in 2011. 
 
With this knowledge, it is possible to test the hypotheses. Testing the hypotheses will lead to a 
better image on how national role conceptions, and its indicators, can explain voting behavior 
of veto powers in the United Nations Security Council. One by one, the hypotheses will be 
discussed and subsequently, be adopted or rejected. Once all the hypotheses have been 
reviewed, the effect of national role conceptions on voting behavior on the United Nations 
Security Council will be argued. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ten variables, are indicators of national role conceptions. 
Connecting the numbers from Table 8 to actual indicators of national role conceptions, a view 
will arise of the most important indicators for national role conception(s) of the United States, 
for both 2011 and 2016. The level of influence in both years is in between 3 and 4, meaning 
regional and/or global. The perception of dominance is in between 2 and 3, meaning example 
or leader. The motivations are non-individualistic and in between cooperative and mixed. 
Furthermore, the amount of change proposed in both cases is some change. Interestingly, the 
only indicator on a particular issue are that was mentioned in more than half of the statements 
regarding the veto on 18 February 2011 is universal values, while in statements regarding the 
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abstention vote on 23 December 2016, the only indicator on a particular issue that was 
mentioned in more than half of the statements is territorial/defense. 
 
Referring back to the goal of this research, namely to find out if cognitive consistency and 
national role conceptions contribute to a better understanding of voting behavior of veto 
powers in the United Nations Security Council, the hypotheses need to be tested. As shown in 
Table 8, every variable that is a part of national role conceptions has shifted one way or 
another, or has changed in importance in the national role conceptions of the United States. 
This research focuses on the differences between 2011 and 2016 and the hypotheses will be 
tested accordingly. Thus, every variable has been tilted more or less towards one side or 
another, or has increased or decreased in importance. Therefore, it is possible to make some 
general statements on the voting behavior of the United States in the United Nations Security 
Council. Starting with hypothesis 1 and 2, the first one is linked to a more national level of 
influence and the second one to a more global level of influence. In 2016, the conception of 
the level of influence of the United States was more global than in 2011. Therefore, 
hypothesis 1 applies to draft resolution 24 on 18 Feb 2011 and hypothesis 2 applies to 
resolution 2334 on 23 December 2016. Note that this does not mean that the level of influence 
was national in absolute terms in 2011, although it may seem this way. Only the level of 
influence was more national in 2011 than in 2016, hence, the connection between hypothesis 
1 and the veto of 2011. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more a veto power sees its level of influence as national, the more likely 
the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
Hypothesis 2: The more a veto power sees its level of influence as global, the less likely the 
veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
Since it is established that the United States sees its level of influence more as national in  
relation to draft resolution 24 in 2011 than in 2016 and the right to veto was exercised in  
2011, hypothesis 1 is adopted. On the other side, since the level of influence of the United  
States was more seen to be global in relation to resolution 2334 in 2016 than in 2011 and  
there was not a veto casted in the United Nations Security Council, hypothesis 2 is also  
adopted. An important notion, however, is that in both of the cases the level of influence lied  
between regional and global, not even nearby the national level. 
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Hypothesis 3: The more a veto power’s perception of dominance is as equal, the less likely  
the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
Hypothesis 4: The more a veto power’s perception of dominance is as leader, the more likely  
the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
Table 8 shows that the perception of dominance of the United States was higher in 2016 than 
it was in 2011. Therefore, the perception of dominance in 2016 is more as leader and in 2011,  
the perception of dominance is more as equal if both cases are compared to each other. This  
means that hypotheses 3 relates to the veto of 2011 and hypothesis 4 to the abstention vote in  
2016. Because the US’ perception of dominance was more as equal in 2011 than in 2016 and  
the US exercised their right to veto in 2011, hypothesis 3 is rejected. The perception of  
dominance of the United States was more as leader in 2016 than in 2011 and the United States  
voted to abstain in 2016. Hence, hypothesis 4 is also rejected. But what can explain the  
rejection of these hypotheses? My guess is that veto powers are already among the most  
powerful nations in the world and that their perception of dominance will not make such a  
difference in whether they will use their right to veto or not, since they clearly already have a  
great deal of power. Furthermore, I would not be surprised that a veto power that believes his  
perception of dominance has shrunk or is shrinking is more likely to use their right to veto in  
the United Nations Security Council to increase his perception of dominance. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The more a veto power’s motivations are individualistic, the more likely the  
veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
Hypothesis 6: The more a veto power’s motivations are non-individualistic, the less likely the  
veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
In relation to the veto vote regarding draft resolution 24 on 18 February 2011, the motivations 
of the United States were more non-individualistic than in 2016, with the averages of 1,775 
and 1,73. To avoid confusion, the motivations of the United States were more individualistic 
in 2016 than in 2011. Hypothesis 5 states that more individualistic motivations are more likely 
to lead to the cast of a veto in the United Nations Security Council. The motivations of the 
United States were more individualistic in 2016 than in 2011, but they did not use their right 
to veto in 2016. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is rejected. The same happens for hypothesis 6. In 
2011, the motivations of the United States were more non-individualistic, but they did 
exercise their right to veto. Hence, hypothesis 6 is also rejected. However, it must not be 
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forgotten that in both cases the United States’ motivations were extremely tilted towards non-
individualistic motivations. Besides that, the difference between the two cases on this 
variables is only 0,0424, which is close to nothing. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The more a veto power’s motivations are cooperative, the less likely the veto  
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
Hypothesis 8: The more a veto power’s motivations are competitive, the more likely the veto  
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
The motivations of the United States are more cooperative in relation to draft resolution 24 in  
2011 than in 2016 (1,47 versus 1,56), but they did use their right to veto in 2011. Hence,  
hypothesis 7 is rejected. This goes the other way round as well. While the United States’  
motivations were more competitive in 2016 compared to 2011, they did not use their right to  
veto in 2016. Therefore, hypothesis 8 is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 9: The more a veto power wants to maintain the status quo, the more likely the  
veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
Hypothesis 10: The more a veto power wants to change the system, the less likely the veto  
power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
There was more amount of change proposed in 2011 than in 2016 (2,12 versus 1,97).  
However, the hypotheses state that more change will lead to a situation where a veto power is  
less likely to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 9 and Hypothesis 10 are rejected. Obviously, one must take into account that the  
mere stance that one wants to change or not is not a well indicator of a state’s national role  
conception. In my opinion, this variable needs to be seen in the light together with other  
variables to make a useful statement. Therefore, hypothesis 9 and 10 are not interesting on its  
own.  
 
Hypothesis 11: The more a veto power wants to defend their or other’s territory, or focuses on  
the security of its own or others, the less likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in  
the United Nations Security Council. 
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The United States was more interested in defending their or other’s territory and  the security  
of its own and others in 2016 than it was in 2011 (57,47% versus 49,38%). Hypothesis 11  
suggests that veto powers that are more interested in defending their other’s territory and the  
security of its own and others are less likely to use their right to veto. In this case, that seems  
to be true and hypothesis 11 is adopted. 
 
Hypothesis 12: The more a veto power wants to defend or promote a value system or way of  
life, the more likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security  
Council. 
 
While the defending or promoting a value system or way of life was only mentioned in  
23,46% of the statements regarding the draft resolution 24 in 2011, it was mentioned in  
33,33% of the statements regarding resolution 2334. The United States, apparently, was more  
focused on this in 2016 than in 2011. Even so, in 2016, the US voted to abstain in the United  
Nations Security Council and did not use their right to veto. This means that hypothesis 12 is  
rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 13: The more a veto power wants to influence the position or relationships  
between states, the less likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations  
Security Council. 
 
The United States was more interested in influencing the position or relationships between  
states in 2011 (23,46%) than in 2016 (20,69%). In 2011, the US did use their right to veto in  
the UNSC. Therefore, hypothesis 13 is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The more a veto power wants to promote peace, justice, or human rights, the  
less likely the veto power is to use their right to veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
In relation to the veto vote on draft resolution 24 on 18 February 2011, the United States  
wanted to promote peace or human rights in 54,32% of the analyzed statements, compared to  
29,89% of the statements considering resolution 2334 in 2016. It is clear that the United  
States was more interested in promoting peace, justice and human rights in 2011 than in 2016.  
However, hypothesis 14 states that this would have lead to less likeliness to use the right to  
veto in the UNSC, but this has not happened. Therefore, hypothesis 14 is rejected. 
30 
 
Hypothesis 15: The more a veto power wants to maintain or expand their or other’s economic  
capabilities, resources or development, the less likely the veto power is to use their right to  
veto in the United Nations Security Council. 
 
In 2011, the United States had mentioned the maintaining or expanding their or other’s  
economic capabilities, resources or development in 23,46% of the statements, compared to  
33,33% in 2016. According to hypothesis 15, this shift would have lead to less likeliness of  
the use of the right to veto by a veto power and this is precisely what happened, because in  
2016 the United States did not use their right to veto. Thus, hypothesis 15 is adopted. 
 
After the discussion of the hypotheses, it is necessary to go back to the goal of this research. 
In order to find out if the combination of cognitive consistency and national role conceptions 
will lead to a better explanation of voting behavior of veto powers in the United Nations 
Security Council the research results need to be interpreted in this way. Cognitive consistency 
is defined as ‘perception, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers.’ National role 
conceptions are a product of the perception, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers and 
are defined as the ‘perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers about how their 
nations should act in the international system.’ The ten variables that has been research are the 
classification of Wish and together, they make up for national role conceptions. From the 
national role conceptions listed in Table 2, the most relevant national role conceptions for the 
United States can be looked for. The roles of regional protector, hegemon, integrator and 
developer are  the national role conceptions that are appear the most often in 2011 and 2016. 
Table 9 shows the scores from the research together with the attached labels from the coding 
manual that are indicators of national role conceptions. 
Table 9: Scores and indicators of national role conceptions 
Variable 18 Feb 2011 – ‘Veto’ 23 Dec 2016 – ‘Abstaining’ 
Level of influence 3,2179 (regional – global) 3,3678 (regional – global) 
Perception of dominance 2,2394 (example – leader) 2,3571 (example – leader) 
Motivations I 1,775 (non-individualistic) 1,7326 (non-individualistic) 
Motivations II 1,4706 (cooperative – mixed) 1,5658 (cooperative – mixed) 
Amount of change proposed 2,1159 (some change) 1,9714 (some change) 
Territorial/defense 49,38% 57,47% (most relevant) 
Ideological 23,46% 33,33% 
Political/diplomatic 23,46% 20,69% 
Universal values 54,32% (most relevant) 29,89% 
Economic 23,46% 33,33% 
31 
 
As Table 9 shows, there has not been much change between the indicators of national role 
conceptions between 2011 and 2016. So what influence do national role conceptions have on 
voting behavior of veto powers in the UNSC? There is one variable that has dropped 
dramatically in importance and another variable that has gained more importance. While 
universal values were the most important issue area in 2011, being mentioned in more than 
half of the statements, it was only mentioned roughly 30 per cent in the statements in 2016.  
On the other hand, the variable ‘territorial/defense’ was mentioned in 49,38% of the 
statements regarding the veto in 2011 and in 57,47% in statements regarding the abstention in 
2016. This change between the most important issues and the two voting moments is an 
indicator that national role conceptions have influence on the voting behavior of veto powers 
in the UNSC. Apparently, when the United States views the promotion of a situation of peace, 
justice or human rights the most important, it is more likely to use its right to veto. 
Furthermore, when the United States believes that defending their own or other’s territory, or 
the security of its own or other states is the most important, the veto power is less likely to use 
its right to veto.  
 
Conclusion 
The results that I have found need to implicate an answer to the research question: how do 
national role conceptions influence voting behavior of states with veto power in the United 
Nations Security Council? Based on the outcomes of the tested hypotheses, table 10 shows the 
division between the indicators that make the ‘veto’ vote more likely and indicators that make 
the ‘abstention’ vote more likely, or as this research has treated it, as a ‘non-veto.’ 
 
Table 10: Indicators and the inclination towards ‘veto’ or ‘abstaining’ 
Veto Abstaining 
Level of influence: more national Level of influence: more global 
Perception of dominance: more as equal Perception of dominance: more as leader 
Motivations I: more non-individualistic Motivations I: more individualistic 
Motivations II: more cooperative Motivations II: more competitive 
Amount of change proposed: more change Amount of change proposed: more status quo 
- More territorial/defense 
- More ideological 
More political/diplomatic - 
More universal values - 
- More economic 
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Table 10 shows two ‘profiles’ that show which indicators of national role conceptions are 
more inclined towards a ‘veto’ vote and which indicators towards an ‘abstaining’ vote. This 
combinations of indicators show the influence of national role conceptions and voting 
behavior of veto powers in the UNSC. Moreover, the research results need to be seen in the 
light of the theoretical framework. Firstly, cognitive consistency shape national role 
conception through the perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers. Secondly, 
national role conceptions are made of ten variables that indicate the national role conception. 
The scores on each of these variables are counted through content analysis of statements from 
Obama and the Permanent Representative of the US at UNSC. The outcome of these results is 
that on the basis of the most indicators there has not been much change between these related 
to draft resolution 24 on 18 February 2011 and those regarding resolution 2334 on 23 
December 2016. However, there has been a notable change in two variables, namely in 
‘universal values’ and ‘territorial/defense.’ In 2011, the United States’ most important issue 
was the promotion of a situation of peace, justice or human rights, while this changed in 2016 
to the maintenance and defense of its own or its collaborator’s territorial integrity or security. 
The shift in importance between these two indicators of national role conceptions might 
explain the change in voting behavior of veto powers in the United Nations Security Council. 
Considering that the perceptions, images and beliefs of foreign policy makers decide how 
their nations should act in the international system, whether on which issue area to focus on 
for example, a change thereof could lead to an explanation of voting behavior of veto powers 
in the UNSC. Since the remaining eight variables hardly shifted between the time of the votes 
on the respective resolutions, in the light of national role conceptions the variables ‘universal 
values’ and ‘territorial/defense’ are responsible for the change in voting behavior. Therefore, I 
argue that, within the ten indicating variables of national role conceptions, the chosen issue 
areas that are focused on are more relevant in order to explain voting behavior of a veto power 
in the United Nations Security Council, than variables regarding the perception of status, 
power, and influence, or the motivational orientation of national role conceptions. 
 
This research has contributed to the current state of research by including the concept of 
cognitive consistency to national role conceptions. Additionally, this research applied national 
role conceptions to the voting behavior of veto powers in the United Nations Security 
Council. While it is not new to apply national role conceptions to a certain kind of foreign 
policy behavior, my contribution is that I have applied this concept to voting behavior in the 
UNSC, this is a link that has not been made before. Furthermore, this combination of theories 
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has given us a better perspective on voting behavior in the UNSC. The influence of human 
begins in foreign policy behavior is important, it seems, contrary to what Wendt believes. 
Additionally, the research results contribute to a better understanding of voting behavior of 
veto powers in the UNSC. So, indicators of national role conceptions are useful in this sense, 
to explain such voting behavior. But most importantly, this research pointed out the fact that 
the chosen issue areas of national role conceptions are a better indicator of voting behavior in 
the UNSC than either the perception of status, power, and influence, or motivational 
orientations. 
 
Reflection and discussion 
However, there are a few shortcomings in this research. The effect of cognitive consistency 
on national role conceptions does not appear clearly in the research results. By choosing 
different levels of analysis, the individual decision-maker and the national role, I could have 
put more emphasis on the individual decision-maker part in the light of cognitive consistency. 
Another point is that I did not go further into depth regarding voting behavior in the UNSC in 
general and the voting procedure in the UNSC. Further research could maybe investigate 
these options in order to find more explanations from different perspectives than cognitive 
consistency and national role conceptions. The data selection I have done included two 
statements that were not of President Obama and, therefore, the indicators of the national role 
conceptions are not only from the perception, images and beliefs of only one decision-maker, 
but two. Cognitive consistency could have studied better if I had included only statements 
from Obama. Even more, the coding manual I created could have had more categories for 
every variable, making a more accurate description of national role conceptions. While few 
categories for the variables made it easy to work with, the reality is that perceptions, images 
and beliefs are broader than just a handful of categories. Regarding my research method, 
content analysis, the addition of intra-coder testing would have made my results stronger. If I 
had done another round of coding with the exact same statements, coding schedule and coding 
manual, I could have compared the results and see if the content analysis results have a proper 
level of intra-coder reliability. Moreover, another shortcoming is that the ten variables taken 
from Wish are from 1980 and might be both outdated and too much present in a Cold War 
setting. For example, the variable ‘amount of change proposed’ I did not find useful and 
interesting to research, because the international system has changed immensely since the end 
of the Cold War and I believe that while this variable might be interesting to research during 
the Cold War in the light of communism or capitalism, I do not think that in the current 
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dynamic international system this is a applicable variable for national role conceptions. In 
addition, all the variables are state-minded, which makes it difficult to categorize terrorist 
networks or international organizations. Also, climate change and energy reform are not 
accounted for in my model, but are important subjects in current international politics. 
 
Recommendations for further research would be to take a critical look at the indicators of 
national role conceptions in the light of the current international system. Further research 
could take a new approach to the indicators of national role conceptions by implementing 
contemporary influences and subjects into these indicators. Such a classification of national 
role conceptions should definitely include: organizations that are not state-orientated, like 
terrorist networks, preferably more categories to measure every variable in the coding manual, 
a removal of amount of change proposed and the addition of more issue areas such as climate 
change or energy reform. Additionally, it would be interesting to test my results on other veto 
powers in the UNSC on different matters than the voting on resolutions regarding Israeli 
settlements as well as researching the combination of national role conceptions and the 
rational school. 
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